2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
16 #include <linux/security.h>
17 #include <linux/magic.h>
18 #include <linux/parser.h>
19 #include <linux/slab.h>
20 #include <linux/rculist.h>
21 #include <linux/genhd.h>
22 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
26 /* flags definitions */
27 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
28 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
29 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
30 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
31 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
32 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
33 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
34 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
35 #define IMA_PCR 0x0100
36 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
39 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
40 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
41 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
42 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
45 #define DONT_HASH 0x0200
47 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
48 (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
51 static int temp_ima_appraise;
52 static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
54 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
55 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
56 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
59 enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
61 struct ima_rule_entry {
62 struct list_head list;
67 unsigned long fsmagic;
71 bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
72 bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
75 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
76 void *args_p; /* audit value */
77 int type; /* audit type */
83 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
84 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
88 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
89 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
90 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
91 * and running executables.
93 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
94 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
96 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
97 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
98 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
99 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
100 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
101 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
102 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
103 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
104 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
105 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC,
106 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
107 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
110 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
111 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
112 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
113 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
114 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
115 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
116 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
117 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
118 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
119 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
122 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
123 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
124 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
125 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
126 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
127 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
128 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
129 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
130 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
131 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
132 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
133 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
134 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
135 {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
138 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
139 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
140 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
141 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
142 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
143 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
144 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
145 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
146 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
147 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
148 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
149 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
150 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
151 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
152 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
153 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
154 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
156 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
157 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
158 .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
160 /* force signature */
161 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
162 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
166 static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
167 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
168 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
169 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
171 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
172 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
173 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
175 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
176 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
177 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
179 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
180 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
181 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
185 static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
186 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
187 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
188 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
189 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
190 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
191 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
192 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
193 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
196 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
197 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
198 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
199 static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
201 static int ima_policy __initdata;
203 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
208 ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
211 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
213 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
214 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
215 static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
216 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
220 while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) {
223 if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
224 ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
225 else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
226 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
227 else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
228 ima_use_secure_boot = true;
229 else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
230 ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
235 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
237 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
239 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
242 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
244 static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
251 kfree(entry->fsname);
252 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
253 security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
254 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
260 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
261 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
262 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
265 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
267 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
271 list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
272 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
273 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
275 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
277 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
278 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
279 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
285 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
286 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
287 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
288 * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
289 * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
290 * @func: LIM hook identifier
291 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
293 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
295 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
296 const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
297 enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
301 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
302 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
304 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
305 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
307 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
308 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
310 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
311 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
313 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSNAME)
314 && strcmp(rule->fsname, inode->i_sb->s_type->name))
316 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
317 !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
319 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
321 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
322 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
323 if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)
324 && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid)
325 && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
327 } else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid))
331 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
332 !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner))
334 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
339 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
346 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
347 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
356 rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
364 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
366 ima_lsm_update_rules();
376 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
377 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
379 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
381 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
382 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
386 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
388 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
390 return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE;
393 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
394 case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
396 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
401 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
402 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
403 * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
405 * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
406 * @func: IMA hook identifier
407 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
408 * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
410 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
413 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
414 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
415 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
417 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
418 enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
420 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
421 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
424 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
426 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
429 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
432 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
434 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
435 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) {
436 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
438 if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs)
439 action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS;
442 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
443 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
445 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
447 if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
459 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
460 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
461 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
462 * can be made earlier.
464 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
466 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
468 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
469 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
470 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
473 ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise);
475 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
478 static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
480 if (func == MODULE_CHECK)
481 return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
482 else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
483 return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
484 else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
485 return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
486 else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
487 return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
492 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
494 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
495 * the new ima_policy_rules.
497 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
499 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
501 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
502 measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
503 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
504 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
505 secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
506 ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
508 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
509 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
511 switch (ima_policy) {
513 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
514 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
518 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
519 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
526 * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file
527 * signatures, prior to any other appraise rules.
529 for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
530 list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
532 ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func);
536 * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures
537 * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise
540 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); i++) {
541 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
543 if (!secure_boot_entries)
544 list_add_tail(&build_appraise_rules[i].list,
547 entry = kmemdup(&build_appraise_rules[i], sizeof(*entry),
550 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
551 build_ima_appraise |=
552 ima_appraise_flag(build_appraise_rules[i].func);
555 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
556 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
558 if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
559 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
562 ima_update_policy_flag();
565 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
566 int ima_check_policy(void)
568 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
574 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
576 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
577 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
578 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
581 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
582 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
584 void ima_update_policy(void)
586 struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules;
588 list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
590 if (ima_rules != policy) {
594 ima_update_policy_flag();
599 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
600 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
601 Opt_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash,
602 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
603 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
604 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsname,
605 Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq,
606 Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
607 Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
608 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
612 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
613 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
614 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
615 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
616 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
617 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
619 {Opt_dont_hash, "dont_hash"},
620 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
621 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
622 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
623 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
624 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
625 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
626 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
627 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
628 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
629 {Opt_fsname, "fsname=%s"},
630 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
631 {Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"},
632 {Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"},
633 {Opt_fowner_eq, "fowner=%s"},
634 {Opt_uid_gt, "uid>%s"},
635 {Opt_euid_gt, "euid>%s"},
636 {Opt_fowner_gt, "fowner>%s"},
637 {Opt_uid_lt, "uid<%s"},
638 {Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"},
639 {Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
640 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
641 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
646 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
647 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
651 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
654 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
655 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
658 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
659 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
661 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
662 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
663 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
664 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
665 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
672 static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
673 bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t))
678 if (rule_operator == &uid_gt)
679 audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
680 else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt)
681 audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
683 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
684 audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value);
686 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
688 ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, NULL);
691 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
693 struct audit_buffer *ab;
699 ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
700 AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
702 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
703 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
704 entry->uid_op = &uid_eq;
705 entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq;
706 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
707 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
708 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
714 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
716 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
719 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
721 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
724 entry->action = MEASURE;
726 case Opt_dont_measure:
727 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
729 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
732 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
735 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
737 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
740 entry->action = APPRAISE;
742 case Opt_dont_appraise:
743 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
745 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
748 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
751 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
753 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
756 entry->action = AUDIT;
759 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "hash");
761 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
764 entry->action = HASH;
767 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_hash");
769 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
772 entry->action = DONT_HASH;
775 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
780 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
781 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
782 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
783 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
784 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
785 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
786 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
787 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
788 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
789 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
790 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
791 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
792 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
793 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
794 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0)
795 entry->func = CREDS_CHECK;
796 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
798 entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
799 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
801 entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
802 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
803 entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
807 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
810 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
819 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
820 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
821 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
822 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
823 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
824 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
825 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
826 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
830 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
831 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
834 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
836 if (entry->fsmagic) {
841 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
843 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
846 ima_log_string(ab, "fsname", args[0].from);
848 entry->fsname = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
849 if (!entry->fsname) {
854 entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
857 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
859 if (!uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) {
864 result = uuid_parse(args[0].from, &entry->fsuuid);
866 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
870 entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
873 if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
874 entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
877 uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
878 (token == Opt_uid_gt) ||
879 (token == Opt_uid_lt);
881 ima_log_string_op(ab, uid_token ? "uid" : "euid",
882 args[0].from, entry->uid_op);
884 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
889 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
891 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
893 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
897 entry->flags |= uid_token
898 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
902 entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
904 if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
905 entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
907 ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
910 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
915 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
917 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
918 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
921 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
925 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
926 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
931 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
932 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
937 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
938 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
943 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
944 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
949 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
950 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
955 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
956 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
960 case Opt_appraise_type:
961 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
966 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
967 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
968 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
972 case Opt_permit_directio:
973 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
976 if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
980 ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
982 result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
983 if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr))
986 entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
990 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
995 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
997 else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
998 temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
1000 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
1006 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
1007 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
1009 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
1010 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
1012 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
1014 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
1016 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
1017 ssize_t result, len;
1020 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
1021 len = strlen(p) + 1;
1022 p += strspn(p, " \t");
1024 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
1027 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
1029 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
1030 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
1034 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
1036 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
1038 ima_free_rule(entry);
1039 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
1040 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
1045 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
1051 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
1052 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
1053 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
1054 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
1056 void ima_delete_rules(void)
1058 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
1060 temp_ima_appraise = 0;
1061 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
1062 list_del(&entry->list);
1063 ima_free_rule(entry);
1067 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
1069 mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
1072 static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
1079 #define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
1081 static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
1082 __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
1085 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
1088 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
1091 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
1101 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
1103 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
1106 entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list);
1110 return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
1113 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
1117 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
1118 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
1121 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
1123 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
1125 if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK)
1126 seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]);
1128 seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
1131 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
1133 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
1135 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
1140 if (entry->action & MEASURE)
1141 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
1142 if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
1143 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure));
1144 if (entry->action & APPRAISE)
1145 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise));
1146 if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE)
1147 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
1148 if (entry->action & AUDIT)
1149 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
1150 if (entry->action & HASH)
1151 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_hash));
1152 if (entry->action & DONT_HASH)
1153 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_hash));
1157 if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
1158 policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
1160 if ((entry->flags & IMA_MASK) || (entry->flags & IMA_INMASK)) {
1161 if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK)
1163 if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
1164 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec) + offset);
1165 if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
1166 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write) + offset);
1167 if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
1168 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read) + offset);
1169 if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
1170 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append) + offset);
1174 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) {
1175 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic);
1176 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf);
1180 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSNAME) {
1181 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->fsname);
1182 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsname), tbuf);
1186 if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
1187 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
1188 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
1192 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
1193 seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", &entry->fsuuid);
1197 if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
1198 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1199 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
1200 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_gt), tbuf);
1201 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
1202 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_lt), tbuf);
1204 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_eq), tbuf);
1208 if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
1209 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1210 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
1211 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_gt), tbuf);
1212 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
1213 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_lt), tbuf);
1215 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_eq), tbuf);
1219 if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
1220 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
1221 if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_gt)
1222 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_gt), tbuf);
1223 else if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_lt)
1224 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_lt), tbuf);
1226 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_eq), tbuf);
1230 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
1231 if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
1234 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
1235 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1238 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
1239 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1242 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
1243 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1246 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
1247 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1250 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
1251 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1254 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
1255 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1260 if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
1261 seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
1262 if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
1263 seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
1268 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */