2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
74 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
75 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
77 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
79 static struct sidtab sidtab;
80 struct policydb policydb;
84 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
85 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
86 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
89 static u32 latest_granting;
91 /* Forward declaration. */
92 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
95 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
96 struct context *tcontext,
98 struct av_decision *avd,
99 struct extended_perms *xperms);
101 struct selinux_mapping {
102 u16 value; /* policy value */
104 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
107 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
108 static u16 current_mapping_size;
110 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
111 struct security_class_mapping *map,
112 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
115 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
116 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
119 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
121 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
128 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
129 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
133 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
135 while (map[j].name) {
136 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
137 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
139 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
140 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
141 p_out->num_perms = 0;
145 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
148 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
150 if (pol->reject_unknown)
152 p_out->num_perms = 0;
153 print_unknown_handle = true;
158 while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
159 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
160 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
164 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
166 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
168 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
169 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
170 if (pol->reject_unknown)
172 print_unknown_handle = true;
177 p_out->num_perms = k;
180 if (print_unknown_handle)
181 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
182 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
184 *out_map_p = out_map;
193 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
196 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
198 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
199 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
205 * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
207 static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
211 for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
212 if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
216 return SECCLASS_NULL;
219 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
222 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
223 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
226 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
227 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
229 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
232 avd->allowed = result;
234 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
235 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
237 avd->auditallow = result;
239 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
240 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
242 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
246 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
247 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
248 * should audit that denial
250 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
252 avd->auditdeny = result;
256 int security_mls_enabled(void)
258 return policydb.mls_enabled;
262 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
263 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
266 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
267 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
268 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
269 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
270 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
272 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
273 struct context *tcontext,
274 struct context *xcontext,
275 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
279 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
280 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
281 struct constraint_expr *e;
282 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
285 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
286 switch (e->expr_type) {
302 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
306 val1 = scontext->user;
307 val2 = tcontext->user;
310 val1 = scontext->type;
311 val2 = tcontext->type;
314 val1 = scontext->role;
315 val2 = tcontext->role;
316 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
317 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
320 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
324 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
328 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
330 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
338 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
339 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
342 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
343 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
346 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
347 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
350 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
351 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
354 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
355 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
358 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
359 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
364 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
367 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
370 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
373 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
376 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
390 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
393 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
401 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
404 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
406 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
413 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
415 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
417 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
426 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
429 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
447 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
448 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
450 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
452 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
453 char **permission_names = args;
455 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
457 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
462 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
463 struct context *tcontext,
468 struct common_datum *common_dat;
469 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
470 struct audit_buffer *ab;
472 char *scontext_name = NULL;
473 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
474 char *permission_names[32];
477 bool need_comma = false;
482 tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
483 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
484 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
486 /* init permission_names */
488 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
489 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
492 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
493 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
496 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
497 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
498 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
501 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
502 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
505 /* audit a message */
506 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
507 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
511 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
512 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
513 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
515 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
516 u32 mask = (1 << index);
518 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
521 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
522 need_comma ? "," : "",
523 permission_names[index]
524 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
529 /* release scontext/tcontext */
530 kfree(tcontext_name);
531 kfree(scontext_name);
537 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
538 * on boundary constraint.
540 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
541 struct context *tcontext,
543 struct av_decision *avd)
545 struct context lo_scontext;
546 struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
547 struct av_decision lo_avd;
548 struct type_datum *source;
549 struct type_datum *target;
552 source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
559 target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
563 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
565 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
566 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
568 if (target->bounds) {
569 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
570 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
571 tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
574 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
580 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
583 return; /* no masked permission */
585 /* mask violated permissions */
586 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
588 /* audit masked permissions */
589 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
590 tclass, masked, "bounds");
594 * flag which drivers have permissions
595 * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
597 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
598 struct extended_perms *xperms,
599 struct avtab_node *node)
603 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
604 /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
605 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
606 xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
607 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
608 /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
609 security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
610 node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
613 /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
614 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
619 * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
620 * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
622 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
623 struct context *tcontext,
625 struct av_decision *avd,
626 struct extended_perms *xperms)
628 struct constraint_node *constraint;
629 struct role_allow *ra;
630 struct avtab_key avkey;
631 struct avtab_node *node;
632 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
633 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
634 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
639 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
641 memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
645 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
646 if (printk_ratelimit())
647 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
651 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
654 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
655 * this permission check, then use it.
657 avkey.target_class = tclass;
658 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
659 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
661 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
663 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
664 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
665 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
666 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
667 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
669 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
670 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
671 avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
672 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
673 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
674 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
675 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
676 else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
677 services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
680 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
681 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
688 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
691 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
693 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
694 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
696 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
698 constraint = constraint->next;
702 * If checking process transition permission and the
703 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
706 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
707 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
708 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
709 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
710 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
711 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
715 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
719 * If the given source and target types have boundary
720 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
721 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
723 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
727 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
728 struct context *ncontext,
729 struct context *tcontext,
732 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
733 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
735 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
737 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
739 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
741 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
742 "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
743 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
744 o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
750 if (!selinux_enforcing)
755 static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
756 u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
758 struct context *ocontext;
759 struct context *ncontext;
760 struct context *tcontext;
761 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
762 struct constraint_node *constraint;
769 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
772 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
774 tclass = orig_tclass;
776 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
780 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
782 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
784 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
790 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
792 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
798 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
800 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
806 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
808 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
813 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
819 constraint = constraint->next;
823 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
827 int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
830 return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
834 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
837 return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
842 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
843 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
844 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
845 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
847 * @oldsid : current security identifier
848 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
850 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
852 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
853 struct type_datum *type;
857 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
860 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
862 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
868 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
870 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
876 /* type/domain unchanged */
877 if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
880 index = new_context->type;
882 type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
886 /* not bounded anymore */
891 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
893 if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
896 index = type->bounds;
900 char *old_name = NULL;
901 char *new_name = NULL;
904 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
905 &old_name, &length) &&
906 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
907 &new_name, &length)) {
908 audit_log(current->audit_context,
909 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
910 "op=security_bounded_transition "
912 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
919 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
924 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
928 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
929 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
933 void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
934 struct avtab_node *node)
938 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
939 if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
941 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
942 if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
949 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
950 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
951 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
952 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
953 sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
955 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
956 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
957 xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
958 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
960 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
961 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
962 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
963 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
964 sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
966 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
967 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
968 xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
969 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
971 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
972 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
973 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
974 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
975 sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
977 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
978 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
979 xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
980 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
987 void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
991 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
994 struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
995 struct avtab_key avkey;
996 struct avtab_node *node;
997 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
998 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
1001 xpermd->driver = driver;
1003 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1004 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
1005 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
1007 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1008 if (!ss_initialized)
1011 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1013 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1018 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1020 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1025 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1026 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1027 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1033 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
1034 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
1038 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1039 avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
1040 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1041 scontext->type - 1);
1043 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1044 tcontext->type - 1);
1046 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
1047 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
1048 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
1049 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
1050 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1052 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
1053 services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
1055 cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
1060 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1063 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1068 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
1069 * @ssid: source security identifier
1070 * @tsid: target security identifier
1071 * @tclass: target security class
1072 * @avd: access vector decisions
1073 * @xperms: extended permissions
1075 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
1076 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
1078 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
1081 struct av_decision *avd,
1082 struct extended_perms *xperms)
1085 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1087 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1090 if (!ss_initialized)
1093 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1095 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1100 /* permissive domain? */
1101 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1102 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1104 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1106 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1111 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1112 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1113 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1117 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
1118 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
1120 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1123 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1127 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
1130 struct av_decision *avd)
1132 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1134 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1136 if (!ss_initialized)
1139 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1141 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1146 /* permissive domain? */
1147 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1148 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1150 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1152 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1157 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
1158 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1163 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
1165 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1168 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1173 * Write the security context string representation of
1174 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1175 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
1176 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1177 * the length of the string.
1179 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1188 *scontext_len = context->len;
1190 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1197 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1198 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
1199 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
1200 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
1201 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1206 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1207 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1210 *scontext = scontextp;
1213 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1215 scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1216 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
1217 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
1218 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1220 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1227 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1229 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1231 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1233 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1236 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1237 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1239 struct context *context;
1246 if (!ss_initialized) {
1247 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1250 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1253 scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid],
1254 *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1259 *scontext = scontextp;
1262 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1263 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1267 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1269 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1271 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1273 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1278 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1280 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1287 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1288 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1289 * @scontext: security context
1290 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1292 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1293 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1294 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1296 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1298 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1301 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1303 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1307 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1309 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1310 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1313 struct context *ctx,
1316 struct role_datum *role;
1317 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1318 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1319 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1324 /* Parse the security context. */
1327 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1329 /* Extract the user. */
1331 while (*p && *p != ':')
1339 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1343 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1347 while (*p && *p != ':')
1355 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1358 ctx->role = role->value;
1362 while (*p && *p != ':')
1367 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1368 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1371 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1373 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1378 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
1381 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1382 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
1387 context_destroy(ctx);
1391 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1392 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1395 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1396 struct context context;
1399 /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1403 if (!ss_initialized) {
1406 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1407 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1412 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1417 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1418 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
1421 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1422 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1425 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1427 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1432 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1433 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
1434 scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
1435 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1437 context.len = scontext_len;
1441 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1442 context_destroy(&context);
1444 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1452 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1453 * @scontext: security context
1454 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1455 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1456 * @gfp: context for the allocation
1458 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1459 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1460 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1461 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1463 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
1466 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1467 sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
1470 int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
1472 return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp);
1476 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1477 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1479 * @scontext: security context
1480 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1481 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1482 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1484 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1485 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1486 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1487 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1488 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1489 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1490 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1491 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1493 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1494 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1496 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1497 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1500 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1503 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1504 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1507 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1508 struct context *scontext,
1509 struct context *tcontext,
1511 struct context *newcontext)
1513 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1514 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1516 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
1518 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
1520 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
1522 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1523 "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
1527 n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
1532 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1537 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
1538 u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
1539 const char *objname)
1541 struct filename_trans ft;
1542 struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
1545 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1546 * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1547 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1549 if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
1557 otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
1559 newcontext->type = otype->otype;
1562 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1566 const char *objname,
1570 struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
1571 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1572 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1573 struct avtab_key avkey;
1574 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1575 struct avtab_node *node;
1580 if (!ss_initialized) {
1581 switch (orig_tclass) {
1582 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1592 context_init(&newcontext);
1594 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1597 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1598 sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
1600 tclass = orig_tclass;
1601 sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
1604 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1606 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1611 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1613 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1619 if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
1620 cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
1622 /* Set the user identity. */
1623 switch (specified) {
1624 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1626 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1627 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1629 /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1630 /* Use the process user identity. */
1631 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1635 /* Use the related object owner. */
1636 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1640 /* Set the role to default values. */
1641 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1642 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1643 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1644 newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
1646 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
1647 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1649 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1652 /* Set the type to default values. */
1653 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1654 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1655 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1656 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1658 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
1659 /* Use the type of process. */
1660 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1662 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1663 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1667 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1668 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1669 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1670 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1671 avkey.specified = specified;
1672 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1674 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1676 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1677 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1678 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1679 avdatum = &node->datum;
1686 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1687 newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
1690 /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1692 filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
1693 tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
1695 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1696 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1697 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1698 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
1699 if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
1700 (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
1701 (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
1702 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1703 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1709 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1710 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1711 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
1716 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1717 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1718 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1725 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1726 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1728 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1729 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1735 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1736 * @ssid: source security identifier
1737 * @tsid: target security identifier
1738 * @tclass: target security class
1739 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1741 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1742 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1743 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1744 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1745 * computed successfully.
1747 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1748 const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
1750 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1751 qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
1754 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1755 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
1757 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1758 objname, out_sid, false);
1762 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1763 * @ssid: source security identifier
1764 * @tsid: target security identifier
1765 * @tclass: target security class
1766 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1768 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1769 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1770 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1771 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1772 * computed successfully.
1774 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1779 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
1784 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1785 * @ssid: source security identifier
1786 * @tsid: target security identifier
1787 * @tclass: target security class
1788 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1790 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1791 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1792 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1793 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1794 * computed successfully.
1796 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1801 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
1805 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1806 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1807 struct context *context,
1810 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1812 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1813 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1818 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1823 if (selinux_enforcing)
1826 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1827 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
1833 struct convert_context_args {
1834 struct policydb *oldp;
1835 struct policydb *newp;
1839 * Convert the values in the security context
1840 * structure `c' from the values specified
1841 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1842 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1843 * context is valid under the new policy.
1845 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1849 struct convert_context_args *args;
1850 struct context oldc;
1851 struct ocontext *oc;
1852 struct mls_range *range;
1853 struct role_datum *role;
1854 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1855 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1860 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1869 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1873 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1874 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1877 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1879 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1881 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1883 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1884 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1888 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1889 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1895 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1899 /* Convert the user. */
1901 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1902 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
1905 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1907 /* Convert the role. */
1909 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1910 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
1913 c->role = role->value;
1915 /* Convert the type. */
1917 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1918 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
1921 c->type = typdatum->value;
1923 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1924 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1925 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1928 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1930 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1931 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1932 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1934 mls_context_destroy(c);
1935 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1937 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1938 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1939 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1940 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1943 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1944 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1948 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1949 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1952 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1953 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1958 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1959 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1960 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1965 context_destroy(&oldc);
1971 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1972 rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
1975 context_destroy(&oldc);
1979 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1985 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1987 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1988 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1989 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1990 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1991 selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1992 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
1995 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
1998 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1999 * @data: binary policy data
2000 * @len: length of data in bytes
2002 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
2003 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
2004 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
2005 * loading the new policy.
2007 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
2009 struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
2010 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
2011 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
2012 struct convert_context_args args;
2016 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
2018 oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
2023 newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
2025 if (!ss_initialized) {
2027 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
2029 avtab_cache_destroy();
2034 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
2036 ¤t_mapping_size);
2038 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2039 avtab_cache_destroy();
2043 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
2045 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2046 avtab_cache_destroy();
2050 security_load_policycaps();
2052 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2053 selinux_complete_init();
2054 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2055 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2056 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2057 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2058 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2063 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
2066 rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
2070 newpolicydb->len = len;
2071 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
2072 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2073 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
2074 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2075 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
2077 rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
2079 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
2080 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2084 rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
2088 rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
2090 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
2094 /* Clone the SID table. */
2095 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
2097 rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
2102 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
2103 * in the new SID table.
2105 args.oldp = &policydb;
2106 args.newp = newpolicydb;
2107 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
2109 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
2110 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
2115 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
2116 memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
2117 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
2119 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
2120 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2121 memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
2122 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
2123 security_load_policycaps();
2124 oldmap = current_mapping;
2125 current_mapping = map;
2126 current_mapping_size = map_size;
2127 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2128 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2130 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
2131 policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
2132 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
2135 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2136 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2137 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2138 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2139 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2146 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
2147 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2154 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
2158 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2160 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2166 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
2167 * @protocol: protocol number
2168 * @port: port number
2169 * @out_sid: security identifier
2171 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
2176 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2178 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
2180 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
2181 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
2182 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
2189 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2195 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2197 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
2201 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2206 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2207 * @name: interface name
2208 * @if_sid: interface SID
2210 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
2215 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2217 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
2219 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
2225 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
2226 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2231 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2237 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
2239 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
2242 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2246 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
2250 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
2251 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2260 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2261 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2263 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2264 * @out_sid: security identifier
2266 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
2274 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2281 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
2284 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2286 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2288 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2297 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
2299 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2301 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2310 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2316 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2322 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2324 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2329 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2336 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2337 * @fromsid: starting SID
2338 * @username: username
2339 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2340 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2342 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2343 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2344 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2345 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2346 * number of elements in the array.
2349 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2354 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2355 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2356 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2357 struct user_datum *user;
2358 struct role_datum *role;
2359 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2365 if (!ss_initialized)
2368 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2370 context_init(&usercon);
2373 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2378 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2382 usercon.user = user->value;
2385 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2389 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2390 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2391 usercon.role = i + 1;
2392 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2393 usercon.type = j + 1;
2395 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2398 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2401 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2402 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2406 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2409 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2412 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2418 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2425 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2430 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2431 struct av_decision dummy_avd;
2432 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2433 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2434 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2437 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2449 * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2450 * @fstype: filesystem type
2451 * @path: path from root of mount
2452 * @sclass: file security class
2453 * @sid: SID for path
2455 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2456 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2457 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2459 * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
2461 static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2468 struct genfs *genfs;
2472 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2475 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2476 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2478 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2479 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2488 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2489 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2490 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2491 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2500 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
2512 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2513 * @fstype: filesystem type
2514 * @path: path from root of mount
2515 * @sclass: file security class
2516 * @sid: SID for path
2518 * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
2521 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2528 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2529 retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
2530 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2535 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2536 * @sb: superblock in question
2538 int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
2542 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2543 const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
2545 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2547 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2549 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2555 sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
2557 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
2562 sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
2564 rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
2567 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2570 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2575 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2579 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2583 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2588 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2593 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2598 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2602 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2603 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2606 (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC);
2612 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2616 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2624 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2627 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2628 struct cond_node *cur;
2630 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2633 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2637 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2638 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2639 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2640 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2641 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2642 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2644 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2645 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2646 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2649 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2651 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2654 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2655 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2660 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2663 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2665 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2666 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2667 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2668 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2673 int security_get_bool_value(int index)
2678 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2681 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2685 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
2687 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2691 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2693 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2694 char **bnames = NULL;
2695 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2696 struct cond_node *cur;
2698 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2701 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2702 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2704 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2706 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2707 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2714 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2723 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2724 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2726 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2728 struct context *context1;
2729 struct context *context2;
2730 struct context newcon;
2736 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2741 context_init(&newcon);
2743 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2746 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2748 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2754 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2756 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2761 newcon.user = context1->user;
2762 newcon.role = context1->role;
2763 newcon.type = context1->type;
2764 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2768 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2769 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2770 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2772 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2773 audit_log(current->audit_context,
2774 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2775 "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
2776 "invalid_context=%s", s);
2783 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2785 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2786 context_destroy(&newcon);
2792 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2793 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2794 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2795 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2798 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2799 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2800 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2801 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2803 * | function return | @sid
2804 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2805 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2806 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2807 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2808 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2811 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2816 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2817 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2819 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2821 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2822 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2823 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2824 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2825 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2828 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2829 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2831 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2832 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2836 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2837 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2838 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2839 if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
2842 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2845 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2847 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2848 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2852 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2854 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2855 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2858 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2862 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2863 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2864 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2865 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2867 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2869 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2873 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2875 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2876 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2877 int value = datum->value - 1;
2879 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2880 if (!classes[value])
2886 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2890 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2893 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2894 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2898 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2902 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2903 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2908 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2912 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2914 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2915 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2916 int value = datum->value - 1;
2918 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2925 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2928 struct class_datum *match;
2930 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2933 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2935 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2941 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2942 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2946 if (match->comdatum) {
2947 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2948 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2953 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2959 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2963 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2964 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2970 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2972 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2975 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2977 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2981 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2982 * @req_cap: capability
2985 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2986 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2987 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2990 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
2994 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2995 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
2996 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3001 struct selinux_audit_rule {
3003 struct context au_ctxt;
3006 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3008 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3011 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
3016 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3018 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
3019 struct role_datum *roledatum;
3020 struct type_datum *typedatum;
3021 struct user_datum *userdatum;
3022 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
3027 if (!ss_initialized)
3031 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3032 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3033 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3034 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3035 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3036 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3037 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
3038 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3041 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3042 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3043 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3044 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3045 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
3046 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
3050 /* only the above fields are valid */
3054 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
3058 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
3060 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3062 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
3065 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3066 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3068 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
3071 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
3073 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3074 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3076 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
3079 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
3081 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3082 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3084 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
3087 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
3089 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3090 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3091 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3092 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3093 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
3100 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3103 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
3112 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
3113 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
3117 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
3118 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
3120 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3121 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3122 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3123 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3124 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3125 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3126 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3127 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3128 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3129 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3137 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3138 struct audit_context *actx)
3140 struct context *ctxt;
3141 struct mls_level *level;
3142 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3145 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
3146 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
3150 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3152 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
3157 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3158 if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
3159 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3165 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
3168 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3169 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3172 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
3174 case Audit_not_equal:
3175 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
3179 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3180 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3183 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
3185 case Audit_not_equal:
3186 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
3190 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3191 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3194 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
3196 case Audit_not_equal:
3197 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
3201 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3202 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3203 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3204 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3205 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
3206 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
3207 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
3210 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3213 case Audit_not_equal:
3214 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3218 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3220 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3224 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3228 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
3229 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
3230 !mls_level_eq(level,
3231 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
3234 match = mls_level_dom(level,
3235 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
3241 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3245 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
3247 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
3251 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
3252 err = aurule_callback();
3256 static int __init aurule_init(void)
3260 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
3262 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3266 __initcall(aurule_init);
3268 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3270 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3271 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3272 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3275 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3276 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3277 * already been initialized.
3280 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3285 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3286 if (sid_cache == NULL)
3288 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3289 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3295 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3296 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3297 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3301 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3302 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3303 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3306 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3307 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3308 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
3309 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3310 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3311 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3315 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3319 struct context *ctx;
3320 struct context ctx_new;
3322 if (!ss_initialized) {
3327 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3329 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
3330 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3331 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
3332 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3333 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3335 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3339 context_init(&ctx_new);
3340 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3341 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3342 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3343 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3344 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3345 rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
3350 if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
3353 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3357 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3359 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3363 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3366 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3368 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3373 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3374 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3375 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3378 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3379 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3382 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3385 struct context *ctx;
3387 if (!ss_initialized)
3390 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3393 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3398 secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
3400 if (secattr->domain == NULL)
3403 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3404 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3405 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3406 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3408 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3411 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3414 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3415 * @data: binary policy data
3416 * @len: length of data in bytes
3419 int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
3422 struct policy_file fp;
3424 if (!ss_initialized)
3427 *len = security_policydb_len();
3429 *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3436 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3437 rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
3438 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3443 *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;