2 * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
3 * Use of this source code is governed by the GPLv2 license.
5 * Test code for seccomp bpf.
11 * glibc 2.26 and later have SIGSYS in siginfo_t. Before that,
12 * we need to use the kernel's siginfo.h file and trick glibc
15 #if !__GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 26)
16 # include <asm/siginfo.h>
17 # define __have_siginfo_t 1
18 # define __have_sigval_t 1
19 # define __have_sigevent_t 1
23 #include <linux/filter.h>
24 #include <sys/prctl.h>
25 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
27 #include <linux/prctl.h>
28 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
29 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
31 #include <semaphore.h>
37 #include <linux/elf.h>
39 #include <sys/utsname.h>
40 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
42 #include <sys/times.h>
46 #include <sys/syscall.h>
48 #include "../kselftest_harness.h"
50 #ifndef PR_SET_PTRACER
51 # define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
54 #ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
55 #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
56 #define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
59 #ifndef PR_SECCOMP_EXT
60 #define PR_SECCOMP_EXT 43
63 #ifndef SECCOMP_EXT_ACT
64 #define SECCOMP_EXT_ACT 1
67 #ifndef SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC
68 #define SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC 1
71 #ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
72 #define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1
75 #ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
76 #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2
79 #ifndef SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
83 __u64 instruction_pointer;
88 #ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
89 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS 0x80000000U /* kill the process */
90 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD 0x00000000U /* kill the thread */
92 #ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL
93 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
94 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
95 #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
96 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
97 #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
99 #ifndef SECCOMP_RET_LOG
100 #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
104 # if defined(__i386__)
105 # define __NR_seccomp 354
106 # elif defined(__x86_64__)
107 # define __NR_seccomp 317
108 # elif defined(__arm__)
109 # define __NR_seccomp 383
110 # elif defined(__aarch64__)
111 # define __NR_seccomp 277
112 # elif defined(__hppa__)
113 # define __NR_seccomp 338
114 # elif defined(__powerpc__)
115 # define __NR_seccomp 358
116 # elif defined(__s390__)
117 # define __NR_seccomp 348
119 # warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture"
120 # define __NR_seccomp 0xffff
124 #ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
125 #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
128 #ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
129 #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
132 #ifndef SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL
133 #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
136 #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
137 #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
140 #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG
141 #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1)
144 #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW
145 #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
149 int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
152 return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
156 #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
157 #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]))
158 #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
159 #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]) + sizeof(__u32))
161 #error "wut? Unknown __BYTE_ORDER?!"
164 #define SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED 0xbadbeef
165 #define SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE 0xbadface
166 #define SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS 0xbadfeed
168 TEST(mode_strict_support)
172 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, NULL, NULL);
174 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP");
176 syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
179 TEST_SIGNAL(mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl, SIGKILL)
183 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, NULL, NULL);
185 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP");
187 syscall(__NR_prctl, PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
190 TH_LOG("Unreachable!");
194 /* Note! This doesn't test no new privs behavior */
195 TEST(no_new_privs_support)
199 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
201 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
205 /* Tests kernel support by checking for a copy_from_user() fault on NULL. */
206 TEST(mode_filter_support)
210 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
212 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
214 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, NULL, NULL);
216 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
217 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER!");
221 TEST(mode_filter_without_nnp)
223 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
224 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
226 struct sock_fprog prog = {
227 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
232 ret = prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, NULL, 0, 0);
234 TH_LOG("Expected 0 or unsupported for NO_NEW_PRIVS");
237 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
238 /* Succeeds with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, fails without */
239 /* TODO(wad) check caps not euid */
242 EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
248 #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH 32768
250 TEST(filter_size_limits)
253 int count = BPF_MAXINSNS + 1;
254 struct sock_filter allow[] = {
255 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
257 struct sock_filter *filter;
258 struct sock_fprog prog = { };
261 filter = calloc(count, sizeof(*filter));
262 ASSERT_NE(NULL, filter);
264 for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
265 filter[i] = allow[0];
267 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
270 prog.filter = filter;
273 /* Too many filter instructions in a single filter. */
274 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
276 TH_LOG("Installing %d insn filter was allowed", prog.len);
279 /* One less is okay, though. */
281 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
283 TH_LOG("Installing %d insn filter wasn't allowed", prog.len);
287 TEST(filter_chain_limits)
290 int count = BPF_MAXINSNS;
291 struct sock_filter allow[] = {
292 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
294 struct sock_filter *filter;
295 struct sock_fprog prog = { };
298 filter = calloc(count, sizeof(*filter));
299 ASSERT_NE(NULL, filter);
301 for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
302 filter[i] = allow[0];
304 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
307 prog.filter = filter;
310 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
315 /* Too many total filter instructions. */
316 for (i = 0; i < MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH; i++) {
317 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
322 TH_LOG("Allowed %d %d-insn filters (total with penalties:%d)",
323 i, count, i * (count + 4));
327 TEST(mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict)
329 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
330 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
332 struct sock_fprog prog = {
333 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
338 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
341 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
344 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, 0, 0);
346 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
350 TEST(mode_filter_get_seccomp)
352 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
353 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
355 struct sock_fprog prog = {
356 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
361 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
364 ret = prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
367 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
370 ret = prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
377 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
378 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
380 struct sock_fprog prog = {
381 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
386 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
389 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
395 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
397 struct sock_fprog prog = {
398 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
403 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
406 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
408 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
413 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
414 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_LOG),
416 struct sock_fprog prog = {
417 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
421 pid_t parent = getppid();
423 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
426 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
429 /* getppid() should succeed and be logged (no check for logging) */
430 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
433 TEST_SIGNAL(unknown_ret_is_kill_inside, SIGSYS)
435 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
436 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, 0x10000000U),
438 struct sock_fprog prog = {
439 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
444 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
447 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
449 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid)) {
450 TH_LOG("getpid() shouldn't ever return");
454 /* return code >= 0x80000000 is unused. */
455 TEST_SIGNAL(unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow, SIGSYS)
457 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
458 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, 0x90000000U),
460 struct sock_fprog prog = {
461 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
466 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
469 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
471 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid)) {
472 TH_LOG("getpid() shouldn't ever return");
476 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_all, SIGSYS)
478 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
479 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
481 struct sock_fprog prog = {
482 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
487 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
490 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
494 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one, SIGSYS)
496 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
497 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
498 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
499 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
500 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
501 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
503 struct sock_fprog prog = {
504 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
508 pid_t parent = getppid();
510 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
513 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
516 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
517 /* getpid() should never return. */
518 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
521 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one_arg_one, SIGSYS)
524 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
525 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
526 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
527 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_times, 1, 0),
528 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
529 /* Only both with lower 32-bit for now. */
530 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)),
531 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K,
532 (unsigned long)&fatal_address, 0, 1),
533 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
534 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
536 struct sock_fprog prog = {
537 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
541 pid_t parent = getppid();
543 clock_t clock = times(&timebuf);
545 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
548 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
551 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
552 EXPECT_LE(clock, syscall(__NR_times, &timebuf));
553 /* times() should never return. */
554 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_times, &fatal_address));
557 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one_arg_six, SIGSYS)
560 int sysno = __NR_mmap;
562 int sysno = __NR_mmap2;
564 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
565 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
566 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
567 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, sysno, 1, 0),
568 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
569 /* Only both with lower 32-bit for now. */
570 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(5)),
571 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, 0x0C0FFEE, 0, 1),
572 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
573 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
575 struct sock_fprog prog = {
576 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
580 pid_t parent = getppid();
583 int page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
585 ASSERT_LT(0, page_size);
587 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
590 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
593 fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY);
596 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
597 map1 = (void *)syscall(sysno,
598 NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, page_size);
599 EXPECT_NE(MAP_FAILED, map1);
600 /* mmap2() should never return. */
601 map2 = (void *)syscall(sysno,
602 NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0x0C0FFEE);
603 EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, map2);
605 /* The test failed, so clean up the resources. */
606 munmap(map1, page_size);
607 munmap(map2, page_size);
611 /* This is a thread task to die via seccomp filter violation. */
612 void *kill_thread(void *data)
614 bool die = (bool)data;
617 prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
618 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE;
621 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED;
624 /* Prepare a thread that will kill itself or both of us. */
625 void kill_thread_or_group(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, bool kill_process)
629 /* Kill only when calling __NR_prctl. */
630 struct sock_filter filter_thread[] = {
631 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
632 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
633 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
634 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD),
635 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
637 struct sock_fprog prog_thread = {
638 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter_thread),
639 .filter = filter_thread,
641 struct sock_filter filter_process[] = {
642 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
643 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
644 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
645 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS),
646 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
648 struct sock_fprog prog_process = {
649 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter_process),
650 .filter = filter_process,
653 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
654 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
657 ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0,
658 kill_process ? &prog_process : &prog_thread));
661 * Add the KILL_THREAD rule again to make sure that the KILL_PROCESS
662 * flag cannot be downgraded by a new filter.
664 ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog_thread));
666 /* Start a thread that will exit immediately. */
667 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, kill_thread, (void *)false));
668 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &status));
669 ASSERT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (unsigned long)status);
671 /* Start a thread that will die immediately. */
672 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, kill_thread, (void *)true));
673 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &status));
674 ASSERT_NE(SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE, (unsigned long)status);
677 * If we get here, only the spawned thread died. Let the parent know
678 * the whole process didn't die (i.e. this thread, the spawner,
690 ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
691 if (child_pid == 0) {
692 kill_thread_or_group(_metadata, false);
696 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
698 /* If only the thread was killed, we'll see exit 42. */
699 ASSERT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status));
700 ASSERT_EQ(42, WEXITSTATUS(status));
709 ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
710 if (child_pid == 0) {
711 kill_thread_or_group(_metadata, true);
715 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
717 /* If the entire process was killed, we'll see SIGSYS. */
718 ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status));
719 ASSERT_EQ(SIGSYS, WTERMSIG(status));
722 /* TODO(wad) add 64-bit versus 32-bit arg tests. */
723 TEST(arg_out_of_range)
725 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
726 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(6)),
727 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
729 struct sock_fprog prog = {
730 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
735 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
738 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
740 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
743 #define ERRNO_FILTER(name, errno) \
744 struct sock_filter _read_filter_##name[] = { \
745 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, \
746 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), \
747 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1), \
748 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | errno), \
749 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
751 struct sock_fprog prog_##name = { \
752 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(_read_filter_##name), \
753 .filter = _read_filter_##name, \
756 /* Make sure basic errno values are correctly passed through a filter. */
759 ERRNO_FILTER(valid, E2BIG);
761 pid_t parent = getppid();
763 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
766 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_valid);
769 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
770 EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(0, NULL, 0));
771 EXPECT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
774 /* Make sure an errno of zero is correctly handled by the arch code. */
777 ERRNO_FILTER(zero, 0);
779 pid_t parent = getppid();
781 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
784 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_zero);
787 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
788 /* "errno" of 0 is ok. */
789 EXPECT_EQ(0, read(0, NULL, 0));
793 * The SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask is 16 bits wide, but errno is smaller.
794 * This tests that the errno value gets capped correctly, fixed by
795 * 580c57f10768 ("seccomp: cap SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO data to MAX_ERRNO").
799 ERRNO_FILTER(capped, 4096);
801 pid_t parent = getppid();
803 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
806 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_capped);
809 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
810 EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(0, NULL, 0));
811 EXPECT_EQ(4095, errno);
815 * Filters are processed in reverse order: last applied is executed first.
816 * Since only the SECCOMP_RET_ACTION mask is tested for return values, the
817 * SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask results will follow the most recently applied
818 * matching filter return (and not the lowest or highest value).
822 ERRNO_FILTER(first, 11);
823 ERRNO_FILTER(second, 13);
824 ERRNO_FILTER(third, 12);
826 pid_t parent = getppid();
828 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
831 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_first);
834 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_second);
837 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_third);
840 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
841 EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(0, NULL, 0));
842 EXPECT_EQ(12, errno);
846 struct sock_fprog prog;
851 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
852 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
853 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
854 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
855 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
856 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
859 memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
860 self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
861 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
862 memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
863 self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
866 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRAP)
868 if (self->prog.filter)
869 free(self->prog.filter);
872 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRAP, dfl, SIGSYS)
876 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
879 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
881 syscall(__NR_getpid);
884 /* Ensure that SIGSYS overrides SIG_IGN */
885 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRAP, ign, SIGSYS)
889 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
892 signal(SIGSYS, SIG_IGN);
894 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
896 syscall(__NR_getpid);
899 static siginfo_t TRAP_info;
900 static volatile int TRAP_nr;
901 static void TRAP_action(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
903 memcpy(&TRAP_info, info, sizeof(TRAP_info));
907 TEST_F(TRAP, handler)
910 struct sigaction act;
913 memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
915 sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
917 act.sa_sigaction = &TRAP_action;
918 act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
919 ret = sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL);
921 TH_LOG("sigaction failed");
923 ret = sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL);
925 TH_LOG("sigprocmask failed");
928 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
930 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
933 memset(&TRAP_info, 0, sizeof(TRAP_info));
934 /* Expect the registers to be rolled back. (nr = error) may vary
936 ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
937 /* Silence gcc warning about volatile. */
939 EXPECT_EQ(SIGSYS, test);
940 struct local_sigsys {
941 void *_call_addr; /* calling user insn */
942 int _syscall; /* triggering system call number */
943 unsigned int _arch; /* AUDIT_ARCH_* of syscall */
944 } *sigsys = (struct local_sigsys *)
946 &(TRAP_info.si_call_addr);
950 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getpid, sigsys->_syscall);
951 /* Make sure arch is non-zero. */
952 EXPECT_NE(0, sigsys->_arch);
953 EXPECT_NE(0, (unsigned long)sigsys->_call_addr);
956 FIXTURE_DATA(precedence) {
957 struct sock_fprog allow;
958 struct sock_fprog log;
959 struct sock_fprog trace;
960 struct sock_fprog error;
961 struct sock_fprog trap;
962 struct sock_fprog kill;
965 FIXTURE_SETUP(precedence)
967 struct sock_filter allow_insns[] = {
968 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
970 struct sock_filter log_insns[] = {
971 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
972 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
973 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
974 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
975 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_LOG),
977 struct sock_filter trace_insns[] = {
978 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
979 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
980 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
981 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
982 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE),
984 struct sock_filter error_insns[] = {
985 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
986 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
987 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
988 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
989 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO),
991 struct sock_filter trap_insns[] = {
992 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
993 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
994 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
995 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
996 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
998 struct sock_filter kill_insns[] = {
999 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1000 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1001 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
1002 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1003 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
1006 memset(self, 0, sizeof(*self));
1007 #define FILTER_ALLOC(_x) \
1008 self->_x.filter = malloc(sizeof(_x##_insns)); \
1009 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->_x.filter); \
1010 memcpy(self->_x.filter, &_x##_insns, sizeof(_x##_insns)); \
1011 self->_x.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(_x##_insns)
1012 FILTER_ALLOC(allow);
1014 FILTER_ALLOC(trace);
1015 FILTER_ALLOC(error);
1020 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(precedence)
1022 #define FILTER_FREE(_x) if (self->_x.filter) free(self->_x.filter)
1031 TEST_F(precedence, allow_ok)
1033 pid_t parent, res = 0;
1037 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1040 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1042 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1044 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1046 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
1048 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
1050 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
1052 /* Should work just fine. */
1053 res = syscall(__NR_getppid);
1054 EXPECT_EQ(parent, res);
1057 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest, SIGSYS)
1059 pid_t parent, res = 0;
1063 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1066 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1068 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1070 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1072 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
1074 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
1076 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
1078 /* Should work just fine. */
1079 res = syscall(__NR_getppid);
1080 EXPECT_EQ(parent, res);
1081 /* getpid() should never return. */
1082 res = syscall(__NR_getpid);
1086 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
1092 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1095 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1097 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
1099 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
1101 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1103 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1105 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
1107 /* Should work just fine. */
1108 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1109 /* getpid() should never return. */
1110 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1113 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second, SIGSYS)
1119 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1122 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1124 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1126 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1128 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
1130 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
1132 /* Should work just fine. */
1133 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1134 /* getpid() should never return. */
1135 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1138 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
1144 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1147 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1149 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
1151 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1153 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1155 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
1157 /* Should work just fine. */
1158 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1159 /* getpid() should never return. */
1160 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1163 TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third)
1169 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1172 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1174 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1176 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1178 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
1180 /* Should work just fine. */
1181 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1182 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1185 TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third_in_any_order)
1191 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1194 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1196 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
1198 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1200 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1202 /* Should work just fine. */
1203 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1204 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1207 TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth)
1213 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1216 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1218 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1220 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1222 /* Should work just fine. */
1223 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1225 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1228 TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth_in_any_order)
1234 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1237 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1239 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1241 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1243 /* Should work just fine. */
1244 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1246 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1249 TEST_F(precedence, log_is_fifth)
1251 pid_t mypid, parent;
1256 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1259 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1261 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1263 /* Should work just fine. */
1264 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1265 /* Should also work just fine */
1266 EXPECT_EQ(mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1269 TEST_F(precedence, log_is_fifth_in_any_order)
1271 pid_t mypid, parent;
1276 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1279 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
1281 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1283 /* Should work just fine. */
1284 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1285 /* Should also work just fine */
1286 EXPECT_EQ(mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1289 #ifndef PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
1290 #define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP 0x00000080
1293 /* Catch the Ubuntu 12.04 value error. */
1294 #if PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP != 7
1295 #undef PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
1298 #ifndef PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
1299 #define PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP 7
1302 #define IS_SECCOMP_EVENT(status) ((status >> 16) == PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
1303 bool tracer_running;
1304 void tracer_stop(int sig)
1306 tracer_running = false;
1309 typedef void tracer_func_t(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1310 pid_t tracee, int status, void *args);
1312 void start_tracer(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd, pid_t tracee,
1313 tracer_func_t tracer_func, void *args, bool ptrace_syscall)
1316 struct sigaction action = {
1317 .sa_handler = tracer_stop,
1320 /* Allow external shutdown. */
1321 tracer_running = true;
1322 ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &action, NULL));
1325 while (ret == -1 && errno != EINVAL)
1326 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, 0);
1328 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1330 /* Wait for attach stop */
1333 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, tracee, NULL, ptrace_syscall ?
1334 PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD :
1335 PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP);
1337 TH_LOG("Failed to set PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP");
1338 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1340 ret = ptrace(ptrace_syscall ? PTRACE_SYSCALL : PTRACE_CONT,
1344 /* Unblock the tracee */
1345 ASSERT_EQ(1, write(fd, "A", 1));
1346 ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
1348 /* Run until we're shut down. Must assert to stop execution. */
1349 while (tracer_running) {
1352 if (wait(&status) != tracee)
1354 if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WIFEXITED(status))
1355 /* Child is dead. Time to go. */
1358 /* Check if this is a seccomp event. */
1359 ASSERT_EQ(!ptrace_syscall, IS_SECCOMP_EVENT(status));
1361 tracer_func(_metadata, tracee, status, args);
1363 ret = ptrace(ptrace_syscall ? PTRACE_SYSCALL : PTRACE_CONT,
1367 /* Directly report the status of our test harness results. */
1368 syscall(__NR_exit, _metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
1371 /* Common tracer setup/teardown functions. */
1372 void cont_handler(int num)
1374 pid_t setup_trace_fixture(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1375 tracer_func_t func, void *args, bool ptrace_syscall)
1380 pid_t tracee = getpid();
1382 /* Setup a pipe for clean synchronization. */
1383 ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
1385 /* Fork a child which we'll promote to tracer */
1386 tracer_pid = fork();
1387 ASSERT_LE(0, tracer_pid);
1388 signal(SIGALRM, cont_handler);
1389 if (tracer_pid == 0) {
1391 start_tracer(_metadata, pipefd[1], tracee, func, args,
1393 syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
1396 prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, tracer_pid, 0, 0, 0);
1397 read(pipefd[0], &sync, 1);
1402 void teardown_trace_fixture(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1408 * Extract the exit code from the other process and
1409 * adopt it for ourselves in case its asserts failed.
1411 ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(tracer, SIGUSR1));
1412 ASSERT_EQ(tracer, waitpid(tracer, &status, 0));
1413 if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
1414 _metadata->passed = 0;
1418 /* "poke" tracer arguments and function. */
1419 struct tracer_args_poke_t {
1420 unsigned long poke_addr;
1423 void tracer_poke(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee, int status,
1428 struct tracer_args_poke_t *info = (struct tracer_args_poke_t *)args;
1430 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
1432 /* If this fails, don't try to recover. */
1433 ASSERT_EQ(0x1001, msg) {
1434 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1437 * Poke in the message.
1438 * Registers are not touched to try to keep this relatively arch
1441 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, tracee, info->poke_addr, 0x1001);
1445 FIXTURE_DATA(TRACE_poke) {
1446 struct sock_fprog prog;
1449 struct tracer_args_poke_t tracer_args;
1452 FIXTURE_SETUP(TRACE_poke)
1454 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1455 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1456 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1457 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1),
1458 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1001),
1459 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1463 memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
1464 self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
1465 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
1466 memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
1467 self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
1469 /* Set up tracer args. */
1470 self->tracer_args.poke_addr = (unsigned long)&self->poked;
1472 /* Launch tracer. */
1473 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_poke,
1474 &self->tracer_args, false);
1477 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRACE_poke)
1479 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1480 if (self->prog.filter)
1481 free(self->prog.filter);
1484 TEST_F(TRACE_poke, read_has_side_effects)
1488 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1491 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1494 EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
1495 ret = read(-1, NULL, 0);
1497 EXPECT_EQ(0x1001, self->poked);
1500 TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
1504 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1507 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1510 EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
1511 EXPECT_NE(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1512 EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
1515 #if defined(__x86_64__)
1516 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
1517 # define SYSCALL_NUM orig_rax
1518 # define SYSCALL_RET rax
1519 #elif defined(__i386__)
1520 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
1521 # define SYSCALL_NUM orig_eax
1522 # define SYSCALL_RET eax
1523 #elif defined(__arm__)
1524 # define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
1525 # define SYSCALL_NUM ARM_r7
1526 # define SYSCALL_RET ARM_r0
1527 #elif defined(__aarch64__)
1528 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_pt_regs
1529 # define SYSCALL_NUM regs[8]
1530 # define SYSCALL_RET regs[0]
1531 #elif defined(__hppa__)
1532 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
1533 # define SYSCALL_NUM gr[20]
1534 # define SYSCALL_RET gr[28]
1535 #elif defined(__powerpc__)
1536 # define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
1537 # define SYSCALL_NUM gpr[0]
1538 # define SYSCALL_RET gpr[3]
1539 #elif defined(__s390__)
1540 # define ARCH_REGS s390_regs
1541 # define SYSCALL_NUM gprs[2]
1542 # define SYSCALL_RET gprs[2]
1543 #elif defined(__mips__)
1544 # define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
1545 # define SYSCALL_NUM regs[2]
1546 # define SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM regs[4]
1547 # define SYSCALL_RET regs[2]
1548 # define SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG
1550 # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls"
1553 /* When the syscall return can't be changed, stub out the tests for it. */
1554 #ifdef SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG
1555 # define EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(val, action) EXPECT_EQ(-1, action)
1557 # define EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(val, action) \
1561 EXPECT_EQ(-1, action); \
1562 EXPECT_EQ(-(val), errno); \
1564 EXPECT_EQ(val, action); \
1569 /* Use PTRACE_GETREGS and PTRACE_SETREGS when available. This is useful for
1570 * architectures without HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK (e.g. User-mode Linux).
1572 #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__)
1573 #define HAVE_GETREGS
1576 /* Architecture-specific syscall fetching routine. */
1577 int get_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee)
1581 EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tracee, 0, ®s)) {
1582 TH_LOG("PTRACE_GETREGS failed");
1588 iov.iov_base = ®s;
1589 iov.iov_len = sizeof(regs);
1590 EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov)) {
1591 TH_LOG("PTRACE_GETREGSET failed");
1596 #if defined(__mips__)
1597 if (regs.SYSCALL_NUM == __NR_O32_Linux)
1598 return regs.SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM;
1600 return regs.SYSCALL_NUM;
1603 /* Architecture-specific syscall changing routine. */
1604 void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1605 pid_t tracee, int syscall, int result)
1610 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tracee, 0, ®s);
1613 iov.iov_base = ®s;
1614 iov.iov_len = sizeof(regs);
1615 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov);
1617 EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {}
1619 #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \
1620 defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__)
1622 regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
1624 #elif defined(__mips__)
1626 if (regs.SYSCALL_NUM == __NR_O32_Linux)
1627 regs.SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
1629 regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
1632 #elif defined(__arm__)
1633 # ifndef PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL
1634 # define PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL 23
1637 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL, tracee, NULL, syscall);
1641 #elif defined(__aarch64__)
1642 # ifndef NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL
1643 # define NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL 0x404
1646 iov.iov_base = &syscall;
1647 iov.iov_len = sizeof(syscall);
1648 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, tracee, NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL,
1655 TH_LOG("How is the syscall changed on this architecture?");
1659 /* If syscall is skipped, change return value. */
1661 #ifdef SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG
1662 TH_LOG("Can't modify syscall return on this architecture");
1664 regs.SYSCALL_RET = result;
1668 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, tracee, 0, ®s);
1670 iov.iov_base = ®s;
1671 iov.iov_len = sizeof(regs);
1672 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov);
1677 void tracer_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee,
1678 int status, void *args)
1683 /* Make sure we got the right message. */
1684 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
1687 /* Validate and take action on expected syscalls. */
1690 /* change getpid to getppid. */
1691 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getpid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
1692 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, __NR_getppid, 0);
1695 /* skip gettid with valid return code. */
1696 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_gettid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
1697 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, -1, 45000);
1700 /* skip openat with error. */
1701 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_openat, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
1702 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, -1, -ESRCH);
1705 /* do nothing (allow getppid) */
1706 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getppid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
1710 TH_LOG("Unknown PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG: 0x%lx", msg);
1711 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1717 void tracer_ptrace(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee,
1718 int status, void *args)
1724 /* Make sure we got an empty message. */
1725 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
1729 /* The only way to tell PTRACE_SYSCALL entry/exit is by counting. */
1734 nr = get_syscall(_metadata, tracee);
1736 if (nr == __NR_getpid)
1737 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, __NR_getppid, 0);
1738 if (nr == __NR_gettid)
1739 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, -1, 45000);
1740 if (nr == __NR_openat)
1741 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, -1, -ESRCH);
1744 FIXTURE_DATA(TRACE_syscall) {
1745 struct sock_fprog prog;
1746 pid_t tracer, mytid, mypid, parent;
1749 FIXTURE_SETUP(TRACE_syscall)
1751 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1752 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1753 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1754 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
1755 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1002),
1756 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_gettid, 0, 1),
1757 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1003),
1758 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_openat, 0, 1),
1759 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1004),
1760 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1761 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1005),
1762 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1765 memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
1766 self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
1767 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
1768 memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
1769 self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
1771 /* Prepare some testable syscall results. */
1772 self->mytid = syscall(__NR_gettid);
1773 ASSERT_GT(self->mytid, 0);
1774 ASSERT_NE(self->mytid, 1) {
1775 TH_LOG("Running this test as init is not supported. :)");
1778 self->mypid = getpid();
1779 ASSERT_GT(self->mypid, 0);
1780 ASSERT_EQ(self->mytid, self->mypid);
1782 self->parent = getppid();
1783 ASSERT_GT(self->parent, 0);
1784 ASSERT_NE(self->parent, self->mypid);
1786 /* Launch tracer. */
1787 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_syscall, NULL,
1791 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRACE_syscall)
1793 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1794 if (self->prog.filter)
1795 free(self->prog.filter);
1798 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, ptrace_syscall_redirected)
1800 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1801 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1802 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1805 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid. */
1806 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1809 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, ptrace_syscall_errno)
1811 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1812 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1813 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1816 /* Tracer should skip the open syscall, resulting in ESRCH. */
1817 EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(-ESRCH, syscall(__NR_openat));
1820 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, ptrace_syscall_faked)
1822 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1823 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1824 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1827 /* Tracer should skip the gettid syscall, resulting fake pid. */
1828 EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(45000, syscall(__NR_gettid));
1831 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_allowed)
1835 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1838 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1841 /* getppid works as expected (no changes). */
1842 EXPECT_EQ(self->parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1843 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1846 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_redirected)
1850 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1853 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1856 /* getpid has been redirected to getppid as expected. */
1857 EXPECT_EQ(self->parent, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1858 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1861 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_errno)
1865 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1868 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1871 /* openat has been skipped and an errno return. */
1872 EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(-ESRCH, syscall(__NR_openat));
1875 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_faked)
1879 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1882 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1885 /* gettid has been skipped and an altered return value stored. */
1886 EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(45000, syscall(__NR_gettid));
1889 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, skip_after_RET_TRACE)
1891 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1892 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1893 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1894 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1895 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM),
1896 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1898 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1899 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1904 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1907 /* Install fixture filter. */
1908 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1911 /* Install "errno on getppid" filter. */
1912 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
1915 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should see EPERM. */
1917 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1918 EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
1921 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_RET_TRACE, SIGSYS)
1923 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1924 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1925 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1926 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1927 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
1928 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1930 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1931 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1936 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1939 /* Install fixture filter. */
1940 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1943 /* Install "death on getppid" filter. */
1944 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
1947 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should die. */
1948 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1951 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, skip_after_ptrace)
1953 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1954 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1955 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1956 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1957 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM),
1958 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1960 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1961 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1966 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1967 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1968 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1971 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1974 /* Install "errno on getppid" filter. */
1975 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
1978 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should see EPERM. */
1979 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1980 EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
1983 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_ptrace, SIGSYS)
1985 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1986 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1987 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1988 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1989 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
1990 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1992 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1993 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1998 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1999 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
2000 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
2003 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
2006 /* Install "death on getppid" filter. */
2007 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
2010 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should die. */
2011 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
2014 TEST(seccomp_syscall)
2016 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
2017 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2019 struct sock_fprog prog = {
2020 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
2025 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
2027 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2030 /* Reject insane operation. */
2031 ret = seccomp(-1, 0, &prog);
2032 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2033 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2035 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2036 TH_LOG("Did not reject crazy op value!");
2039 /* Reject strict with flags or pointer. */
2040 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, -1, NULL);
2041 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2042 TH_LOG("Did not reject mode strict with flags!");
2044 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, &prog);
2045 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2046 TH_LOG("Did not reject mode strict with uargs!");
2049 /* Reject insane args for filter. */
2050 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, -1, &prog);
2051 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2052 TH_LOG("Did not reject crazy filter flags!");
2054 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, NULL);
2055 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
2056 TH_LOG("Did not reject NULL filter!");
2059 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
2060 EXPECT_EQ(0, errno) {
2061 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER: %s",
2066 TEST(seccomp_syscall_mode_lock)
2068 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
2069 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2071 struct sock_fprog prog = {
2072 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
2077 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
2079 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2082 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
2083 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2084 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2087 TH_LOG("Could not install filter!");
2090 /* Make sure neither entry point will switch to strict. */
2091 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, 0, 0, 0);
2092 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2093 TH_LOG("Switched to mode strict!");
2096 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, NULL);
2097 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2098 TH_LOG("Switched to mode strict!");
2103 * Test detection of known and unknown filter flags. Userspace needs to be able
2104 * to check if a filter flag is supported by the current kernel and a good way
2105 * of doing that is by attempting to enter filter mode, with the flag bit in
2106 * question set, and a NULL pointer for the _args_ parameter. EFAULT indicates
2107 * that the flag is valid and EINVAL indicates that the flag is invalid.
2109 TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags)
2111 unsigned int flags[] = { SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2112 SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
2113 SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW };
2114 unsigned int flag, all_flags;
2118 /* Test detection of known-good filter flags */
2119 for (i = 0, all_flags = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(flags); i++) {
2123 /* Make sure the flag is a single bit! */
2132 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
2133 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2134 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2137 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
2138 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that a known-good filter flag (0x%X) is supported!",
2145 /* Test detection of all known-good filter flags */
2146 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, all_flags, NULL);
2148 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
2149 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that all known-good filter flags (0x%X) are supported!",
2153 /* Test detection of an unknown filter flag */
2155 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
2157 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2158 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported!",
2163 * Test detection of an unknown filter flag that may simply need to be
2164 * added to this test
2166 flag = flags[ARRAY_SIZE(flags) - 1] << 1;
2167 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
2169 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2170 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported! Does a new flag need to be added to this test?",
2177 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
2178 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2180 struct sock_fprog prog = {
2181 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
2186 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
2188 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2191 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2193 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2194 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2197 TH_LOG("Could not install initial filter with TSYNC!");
2201 #define TSYNC_SIBLINGS 2
2202 struct tsync_sibling {
2206 pthread_cond_t *cond;
2207 pthread_mutex_t *mutex;
2210 struct sock_fprog *prog;
2211 struct __test_metadata *metadata;
2215 * To avoid joining joined threads (which is not allowed by Bionic),
2216 * make sure we both successfully join and clear the tid to skip a
2217 * later join attempt during fixture teardown. Any remaining threads
2218 * will be directly killed during teardown.
2220 #define PTHREAD_JOIN(tid, status) \
2222 int _rc = pthread_join(tid, status); \
2224 TH_LOG("pthread_join of tid %u failed: %d\n", \
2225 (unsigned int)tid, _rc); \
2231 FIXTURE_DATA(TSYNC) {
2232 struct sock_fprog root_prog, apply_prog;
2233 struct tsync_sibling sibling[TSYNC_SIBLINGS];
2235 pthread_cond_t cond;
2236 pthread_mutex_t mutex;
2240 FIXTURE_SETUP(TSYNC)
2242 struct sock_filter root_filter[] = {
2243 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2245 struct sock_filter apply_filter[] = {
2246 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
2247 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
2248 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1),
2249 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
2250 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2253 memset(&self->root_prog, 0, sizeof(self->root_prog));
2254 memset(&self->apply_prog, 0, sizeof(self->apply_prog));
2255 memset(&self->sibling, 0, sizeof(self->sibling));
2256 self->root_prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(root_filter));
2257 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->root_prog.filter);
2258 memcpy(self->root_prog.filter, &root_filter, sizeof(root_filter));
2259 self->root_prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(root_filter);
2261 self->apply_prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(apply_filter));
2262 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->apply_prog.filter);
2263 memcpy(self->apply_prog.filter, &apply_filter, sizeof(apply_filter));
2264 self->apply_prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(apply_filter);
2266 self->sibling_count = 0;
2267 pthread_mutex_init(&self->mutex, NULL);
2268 pthread_cond_init(&self->cond, NULL);
2269 sem_init(&self->started, 0, 0);
2270 self->sibling[0].tid = 0;
2271 self->sibling[0].cond = &self->cond;
2272 self->sibling[0].started = &self->started;
2273 self->sibling[0].mutex = &self->mutex;
2274 self->sibling[0].diverge = 0;
2275 self->sibling[0].num_waits = 1;
2276 self->sibling[0].prog = &self->root_prog;
2277 self->sibling[0].metadata = _metadata;
2278 self->sibling[1].tid = 0;
2279 self->sibling[1].cond = &self->cond;
2280 self->sibling[1].started = &self->started;
2281 self->sibling[1].mutex = &self->mutex;
2282 self->sibling[1].diverge = 0;
2283 self->sibling[1].prog = &self->root_prog;
2284 self->sibling[1].num_waits = 1;
2285 self->sibling[1].metadata = _metadata;
2288 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TSYNC)
2292 if (self->root_prog.filter)
2293 free(self->root_prog.filter);
2294 if (self->apply_prog.filter)
2295 free(self->apply_prog.filter);
2297 for ( ; sib < self->sibling_count; ++sib) {
2298 struct tsync_sibling *s = &self->sibling[sib];
2303 * If a thread is still running, it may be stuck, so hit
2304 * it over the head really hard.
2306 pthread_kill(s->tid, 9);
2308 pthread_mutex_destroy(&self->mutex);
2309 pthread_cond_destroy(&self->cond);
2310 sem_destroy(&self->started);
2313 void *tsync_sibling(void *data)
2316 struct tsync_sibling *me = data;
2318 me->system_tid = syscall(__NR_gettid);
2320 pthread_mutex_lock(me->mutex);
2322 /* Just re-apply the root prog to fork the tree */
2323 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
2326 sem_post(me->started);
2327 /* Return outside of started so parent notices failures. */
2329 pthread_mutex_unlock(me->mutex);
2330 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE;
2333 pthread_cond_wait(me->cond, me->mutex);
2334 me->num_waits = me->num_waits - 1;
2335 } while (me->num_waits);
2336 pthread_mutex_unlock(me->mutex);
2338 ret = prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2340 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS;
2342 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED;
2345 void tsync_start_sibling(struct tsync_sibling *sibling)
2347 pthread_create(&sibling->tid, NULL, tsync_sibling, (void *)sibling);
2350 TEST_F(TSYNC, siblings_fail_prctl)
2354 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
2355 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
2356 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
2357 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
2358 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EINVAL),
2359 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2361 struct sock_fprog prog = {
2362 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
2366 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2367 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2370 /* Check prctl failure detection by requesting sib 0 diverge. */
2371 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
2372 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2373 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2376 TH_LOG("setting filter failed");
2379 self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
2380 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2381 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2383 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2384 sem_wait(&self->started);
2385 self->sibling_count++;
2388 /* Signal the threads to clean up*/
2389 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2390 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2391 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2393 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2395 /* Ensure diverging sibling failed to call prctl. */
2396 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2397 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE, (long)status);
2398 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2399 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2402 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_ancestor)
2407 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2408 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2411 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
2412 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2413 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2416 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
2418 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2419 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2421 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2422 sem_wait(&self->started);
2423 self->sibling_count++;
2426 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2429 TH_LOG("Could install filter on all threads!");
2431 /* Tell the siblings to test the policy */
2432 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2433 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2434 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2436 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2437 /* Ensure they are both killed and don't exit cleanly. */
2438 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2439 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2440 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2441 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2444 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_sibling_want_nnp)
2448 /* start siblings before any prctl() operations */
2449 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2450 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2451 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2452 sem_wait(&self->started);
2453 self->sibling_count++;
2456 /* Tell the siblings to test no policy */
2457 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2458 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2459 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2461 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2463 /* Ensure they are both upset about lacking nnp. */
2464 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2465 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS, (long)status);
2466 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2467 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS, (long)status);
2470 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_no_filter)
2475 /* start siblings before any prctl() operations */
2476 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2477 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2478 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2479 sem_wait(&self->started);
2480 self->sibling_count++;
2483 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2484 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2487 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2489 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2490 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2493 TH_LOG("Could install filter on all threads!");
2496 /* Tell the siblings to test the policy */
2497 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2498 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2499 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2501 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2503 /* Ensure they are both killed and don't exit cleanly. */
2504 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2505 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2506 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2507 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2510 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_one_divergence)
2515 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2516 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2519 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
2520 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2521 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2524 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
2526 self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
2527 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2528 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2530 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2531 sem_wait(&self->started);
2532 self->sibling_count++;
2535 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2537 ASSERT_EQ(self->sibling[0].system_tid, ret) {
2538 TH_LOG("Did not fail on diverged sibling.");
2541 /* Wake the threads */
2542 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2543 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2544 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2546 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2548 /* Ensure they are both unkilled. */
2549 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2550 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2551 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2552 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2555 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_not_under_filter)
2560 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2561 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2565 * Sibling 0 will have its own seccomp policy
2566 * and Sibling 1 will not be under seccomp at
2567 * all. Sibling 1 will enter seccomp and 0
2568 * will cause failure.
2570 self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
2571 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2572 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2574 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2575 sem_wait(&self->started);
2576 self->sibling_count++;
2579 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
2580 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2581 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2584 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
2587 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2589 ASSERT_EQ(ret, self->sibling[0].system_tid) {
2590 TH_LOG("Did not fail on diverged sibling.");
2593 if (ret == self->sibling[0].system_tid)
2596 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2598 /* Increment the other siblings num_waits so we can clean up
2599 * the one we just saw.
2601 self->sibling[!sib].num_waits += 1;
2603 /* Signal the thread to clean up*/
2604 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2605 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2607 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2608 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[sib].tid, &status);
2609 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2610 /* Poll for actual task death. pthread_join doesn't guarantee it. */
2611 while (!kill(self->sibling[sib].system_tid, 0))
2613 /* Switch to the remaining sibling */
2616 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2619 TH_LOG("Expected the remaining sibling to sync");
2622 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2624 /* If remaining sibling didn't have a chance to wake up during
2625 * the first broadcast, manually reduce the num_waits now.
2627 if (self->sibling[sib].num_waits > 1)
2628 self->sibling[sib].num_waits = 1;
2629 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2630 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2632 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2633 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[sib].tid, &status);
2634 EXPECT_EQ(0, (long)status);
2635 /* Poll for actual task death. pthread_join doesn't guarantee it. */
2636 while (!kill(self->sibling[sib].system_tid, 0))
2639 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2641 ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); /* just us chickens */
2644 /* Make sure restarted syscalls are seen directly as "restart_syscall". */
2645 TEST(syscall_restart)
2652 siginfo_t info = { };
2653 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
2654 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
2655 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
2657 #ifdef __NR_sigreturn
2658 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_sigreturn, 6, 0),
2660 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 5, 0),
2661 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_exit, 4, 0),
2662 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn, 3, 0),
2663 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_nanosleep, 4, 0),
2664 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_restart_syscall, 4, 0),
2666 /* Allow __NR_write for easy logging. */
2667 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_write, 0, 1),
2668 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2669 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
2670 /* The nanosleep jump target. */
2671 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE|0x100),
2672 /* The restart_syscall jump target. */
2673 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE|0x200),
2675 struct sock_fprog prog = {
2676 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
2679 #if defined(__arm__)
2680 struct utsname utsbuf;
2683 ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
2686 ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
2687 if (child_pid == 0) {
2688 /* Child uses EXPECT not ASSERT to deliver status correctly. */
2690 struct timespec timeout = { };
2692 /* Attach parent as tracer and stop. */
2693 EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME));
2694 EXPECT_EQ(0, raise(SIGSTOP));
2696 EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
2698 EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2699 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2702 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
2704 TH_LOG("Failed to install filter!");
2707 EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) {
2708 TH_LOG("Failed to read() sync from parent");
2710 EXPECT_EQ('.', buf) {
2711 TH_LOG("Failed to get sync data from read()");
2714 /* Start nanosleep to be interrupted. */
2717 EXPECT_EQ(0, nanosleep(&timeout, NULL)) {
2718 TH_LOG("Call to nanosleep() failed (errno %d)", errno);
2721 /* Read final sync from parent. */
2722 EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) {
2723 TH_LOG("Failed final read() from parent");
2725 EXPECT_EQ('!', buf) {
2726 TH_LOG("Failed to get final data from read()");
2729 /* Directly report the status of our test harness results. */
2730 syscall(__NR_exit, _metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS
2733 EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[0]));
2735 /* Attach to child, setup options, and release. */
2736 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2737 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2738 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child_pid, NULL,
2739 PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP));
2740 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2741 ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], ".", 1));
2743 /* Wait for nanosleep() to start. */
2744 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2745 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2746 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, WSTOPSIG(status));
2747 ASSERT_EQ(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, (status >> 16));
2748 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, child_pid, NULL, &msg));
2749 ASSERT_EQ(0x100, msg);
2750 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_nanosleep, get_syscall(_metadata, child_pid));
2752 /* Might as well check siginfo for sanity while we're here. */
2753 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, child_pid, NULL, &info));
2754 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, info.si_signo);
2755 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP << 8), info.si_code);
2756 EXPECT_EQ(0, info.si_errno);
2757 EXPECT_EQ(getuid(), info.si_uid);
2758 /* Verify signal delivery came from child (seccomp-triggered). */
2759 EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, info.si_pid);
2761 /* Interrupt nanosleep with SIGSTOP (which we'll need to handle). */
2762 ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(child_pid, SIGSTOP));
2763 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2764 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2765 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2766 ASSERT_EQ(SIGSTOP, WSTOPSIG(status));
2767 /* Verify signal delivery came from parent now. */
2768 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, child_pid, NULL, &info));
2769 EXPECT_EQ(getpid(), info.si_pid);
2771 /* Restart nanosleep with SIGCONT, which triggers restart_syscall. */
2772 ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(child_pid, SIGCONT));
2773 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2774 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2775 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2776 ASSERT_EQ(SIGCONT, WSTOPSIG(status));
2777 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2779 /* Wait for restart_syscall() to start. */
2780 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2781 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2782 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, WSTOPSIG(status));
2783 ASSERT_EQ(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, (status >> 16));
2784 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, child_pid, NULL, &msg));
2786 ASSERT_EQ(0x200, msg);
2787 ret = get_syscall(_metadata, child_pid);
2788 #if defined(__arm__)
2791 * - native ARM registers do NOT expose true syscall.
2792 * - compat ARM registers on ARM64 DO expose true syscall.
2794 ASSERT_EQ(0, uname(&utsbuf));
2795 if (strncmp(utsbuf.machine, "arm", 3) == 0) {
2796 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_nanosleep, ret);
2800 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_restart_syscall, ret);
2803 /* Write again to end test. */
2804 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2805 ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], "!", 1));
2806 EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
2808 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2809 if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status))
2810 _metadata->passed = 0;
2813 TEST_SIGNAL(filter_flag_log, SIGSYS)
2815 struct sock_filter allow_filter[] = {
2816 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2818 struct sock_filter kill_filter[] = {
2819 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
2820 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
2821 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
2822 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
2823 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2825 struct sock_fprog allow_prog = {
2826 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(allow_filter),
2827 .filter = allow_filter,
2829 struct sock_fprog kill_prog = {
2830 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(kill_filter),
2831 .filter = kill_filter,
2834 pid_t parent = getppid();
2836 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
2839 /* Verify that the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag isn't accepted in strict mode */
2840 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
2842 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2843 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2846 TH_LOG("Kernel accepted FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag in strict mode!");
2848 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2849 TH_LOG("Kernel returned unexpected errno for FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag in strict mode!");
2852 /* Verify that a simple, permissive filter can be added with no flags */
2853 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &allow_prog);
2856 /* See if the same filter can be added with the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag */
2857 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
2859 ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
2860 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag!");
2864 /* Ensure that the kill filter works with the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag */
2865 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
2869 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
2870 /* getpid() should never return. */
2871 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
2874 TEST(get_action_avail)
2876 __u32 actions[] = { SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
2877 SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE,
2878 SECCOMP_RET_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW };
2879 __u32 unknown_action = 0x10000000U;
2883 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[0]);
2884 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2885 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2887 ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
2888 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL operation!");
2892 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(actions); i++) {
2893 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[i]);
2895 TH_LOG("Expected action (0x%X) not available!",
2900 /* Check that an unknown action is handled properly (EOPNOTSUPP) */
2901 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &unknown_action);
2903 EXPECT_EQ(errno, EOPNOTSUPP);
2908 * - add microbenchmarks
2909 * - expand NNP testing
2910 * - better arch-specific TRACE and TRAP handlers.
2911 * - endianness checking when appropriate
2912 * - 64-bit arg prodding
2913 * - arch value testing (x86 modes especially)
2914 * - verify that FILTER_FLAG_LOG filters generate log messages
2915 * - verify that RET_LOG generates log messages