Fix the reason for the nosmt check

[kconfig-hardened-check.git] / kernel_hardening_checker / checks.py

diff --git a/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py b/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py
index b501049d44c813e6ce6d935e59a3785d35d6a6ae..d1c83db483e553e7c62bd3827ca8c5a660bb3045 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py
+++ b/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py
@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch):
     l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_IOPL_IOPERM', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
     l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
     l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS', 'is not set')]
-    l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'COREDUMP', 'is not set')] # cut userspace attack surface
 #   l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'IKCONFIG', 'is not set')] # no, IKCONFIG is needed for this check :)
 
     # 'cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown'
@@ -376,6 +375,7 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch):
         l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_BTI', 'y')]
     if arch in ('ARM', 'X86_32'):
         l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'VMSPLIT_3G', 'y')]
+    l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'clipos', 'COREDUMP', 'is not set')]
     l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'my', 'ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS', 'MAX')] # 'MAX' value is refined using ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
 
 
@@ -458,7 +458,6 @@ def add_cmdline_checks(l, arch):
 
     # 'self_protection', 'kspp'
     l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt')]
-    l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'nosmt', 'is present')] # slow (high performance penalty)
     l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'slab_merge', 'is not set')] # consequence of 'slab_nomerge' by kspp
     l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'slub_merge', 'is not set')] # consequence of 'slab_nomerge' by kspp
     l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'page_alloc.shuffle', '1')]
@@ -507,6 +506,7 @@ def add_cmdline_checks(l, arch):
                      CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'tsx', 'is not set')))]
 
     # 'cut_attack_surface', 'kspp'
+    l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'nosmt', 'is present')] # slow (high performance penalty)
     if arch == 'X86_64':
         l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vsyscall', 'none'),
                  KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION', 'is not set'),
@@ -580,15 +580,8 @@ def normalize_cmdline_options(option, value):
 # TODO: draft of security hardening sysctls:
 #    what about bpf_jit_enable?
 #    vm.mmap_min_addr has a good value
-#    fs.protected_symlinks=1
-#    fs.protected_hardlinks=1
-#    fs.protected_fifos=2
-#    fs.protected_regular=2
-#    fs.suid_dumpable=0
 #    kernel.modules_disabled=1
-#    kernel.randomize_va_space=2
 #    nosmt sysfs control file
-#    dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti=0
 #    vm.mmap_rnd_bits=max (?)
 #    kernel.sysrq=0
 #    abi.vsyscall32 (any value except 2)
@@ -612,6 +605,14 @@ def add_sysctl_checks(l, arch):
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kptr_restrict', '2')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope', '3')]
+    l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti', '0')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd', '0')]
           # At first, it disabled unprivileged userfaultfd,
           # and since v5.11 it enables unprivileged userfaultfd for user-mode only.
+
+    l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_symlinks', '1')]
+    l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_hardlinks', '1')]
+    l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_fifos', '2')]
+    l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_regular', '2')]
+    l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.suid_dumpable', '0')]
+    l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'kernel.randomize_va_space', '2')]